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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant/Appellant (Husband) respectfully submits the 
fallowing reply brief. This brief first addresses the seven points 
rfeised in Husband's Brief of Appellant and then addresses the five 
points raised in Wife's cross-appeal.1 
life's Brief of Appellee-Cross Appellant responded to 
Hfisband's appeal through Points I through VI. Wife commences her 
cross appeal with Point VII. Herein Husband addresses Points I 
through VII of his appeal and then addresses points VII through XI 
of Wife's cross appeal, citing Wife's Point VII as "Point VII Cross 
Appeal". 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DOUBLE ASSESSING 
HUSBAND FOR SEA DOO DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS, AND FOR 
ASSESSING HUSBAND FOR IRA FUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF BOTH PARTIES 
SEA DOOS 
Wife overlooks, or deliberately avoids, the essential fact 
that the trial court awarded Husband Sea Doos valued at only 
$7,500.00 while inequitably offsetting such amount by ordering 
Husband to assume $12,500.00 in debt associated therewith. This 
$5,000.00 error must be adjusted either by granting Husband 
$2,500.00 more in property or reducing the amount of his debt by 
such amount. The net adjustment must be to increase Husband's 
share of the home equity by $2,500.00. 
HOUSEHOLD ITEMS 
Wife does not dispute that Husband purchased at least 
$4,577.00 in personal property after the parties separated, which 
was awarded to Husband by the trial court. She, for the first time 
on appeal, questions whether such funds were purchased from 
proceeds of the IRA alleging a lack of documentary proof at trial. 
However, at trial Wife made no best evidence or other objection to 
Husband's Exhibit D-28 when it was received by stipulation. (R. 
2317-8) Previously, during adverse examination of Husband, Wife 
only challenged the actual amount spent on childrens' furniture 
from the IRA, not that the funds came from the IRA. (R. 2313) Not 
having reserved such issue at trial, Wife is precluded from raising 
it on appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 46; Doe v. Hafen, 772 P. 2d 456 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
2 
Further, it was uncontroverted that Husband's household items 
were purchased after the parties separated. Therefore, Husband was 
awarded property acquired after separation which was either 
acquired with the IRA proceeds, or, arguendo, Husband's post-
separation income which was reserved to him by the trial court 
after payment of temporary child support and alimony. Either route 
improperly results in double-assessment to Husband. 
Finally, the trial court having made no express finding on 
this issue, must be deemed to have accepted the values set forth in 
Exhibit D-28 as accurate, since Wife stipulated to such exhibit. 
(R. 2317) Certainly, nothing in the records indicates the 
contrary. The effect is to have double-assessed Husband $4,577.00 
for personal property he received. 
IRA VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HUSBAND 
Wife invites this Court to assume a finding which was never 
made by the trial court, to-wit: that the trial court deliberately 
intended to double-assess Husband for taxes he paid to punish 
Husband for removing funds from the IRA contrary to the Court's 
order. (Brief of Appellee-Cross Appellant, p. 27-8) However, 
nowhere in the findings of fact or in any ruling by the trial court 
did the trial court state that it intended to punish Husband by 
double-assessing him on the taxes he had previously paid. Rather, 
the trial court expressly required Husband to be responsible for 
the $6,210.00 tax penalty associated with Husband's unauthorized 
withdrawal of $62,100.00 from the IRA, clearly stating that such 
was Husband's sanction. (R. 1642-1643, Finding of Fact 12) 
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That the trial court ordered the parties to file a joint 1994 
tax return and be equally responsible for the balance of taxes 
thereon shows the trial court's intent that the 1994 tax liability 
be equally shared by the parties, including the portion of taxes 
already paid by Husband with proceeds from the IRA. (R. 2317-2318, 
2390-2391, 2440, 2505, Exh. D-28) The trial court made a math 
error in crediting Husband with still possessing $22,960.00 which 
Husband had long since expended for taxes owed equally by both 
parties.2 This error must be corrected under Endrody v. Endrody, 
914 P.2d 1166, 1170-1, (Utah App. 1996) . 
Cases cited by Wife do not apply herein as the trial court did 
not find that Husband had not expended the funds on taxes. Having 
received Exhibit D-28 by stipulation3, the trial court made no such 
finding and, to the contrary, ordered only that Husband bear full 
responsibility for the $6,210.00 tax penalty associated with the 
early IRA withdrawal. As noted previously, Wife has waived any 
argument regarding lack of documentation by not having raised and 
reserved same at trial. 
Mathematical errors by the trial court require that this Court 
adjust downwards Wife's share of the home equity by the amount of 
$21,756.00 as detailed in Brief of Appellant at page 22. 
2Wife never disputed that Husband had paid $44,640.00 in 
estimated taxes for 1994 as reflected by Exhibit D-19, and the 
court clearly found such to be true. 
3Exhibit D-28 was Husband's accounting of use of the funds 
from the IRA. Wife did not challenge that $22,960.00 of the IRA 
funds were paid to the IRS during her adverse examination of 
Husband. (R. 2390-2391) 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER THE EXPENSE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON THE 
MARITAL HOME AND THEREBY ASSESSING ALL OF SUCH TAXES TO 
HUSBAND. FURTHER, THE NEW TAX LAW MAY SUBSTANTIALLY 
INCREASE HUSBAND'S TAX LIABILITY. 
Appellant recognizes that since the date of trial and since 
Appellant filed his Brief of Appellant, Congress has changed the 
capital gains tax laws regarding sales of homes. However, contrary 
to Wife's contention, the change in the tax law may well result in 
a greater tax disaster to Husband. 
Section 121 of Title 26 U.S.C. as recently amended is set 
forth in Appendix A. Under Section 121(b)(1) a $250,000.00 
exclusion would be available to Husband provided he met the 
requirements of Section 121(a).4 However, to qualify for the 
exclusion under Section 121(a), Husband must have owned and resided 
in the home for at least two of the five years preceding the date 
4Husband reserved this issue, when he argued to the trial 
court: 
The Court has also failed to consider the capital gains 
consequences. The capital gains should be divided 
equally or prorated based upon who derives the most 
profit from the sale of the house. (R. 1232) 
The trial court was clearly on notice that taxes were being 
discussed by the words "capital gains consequences", as taxes are 
the most obvious and important "consequences" associated with 
capital gains. Exhibit D-24 shows that the home had equity of 
about $183,000.00 above the mortgage balance at time of trial. 
Wife argues that the record fails to reflect the $265,000.00 tax 
basis of the home. Even without an express record of the tax 
basis, it is clear that the home had a basis somewhere in excess of 
$176,165.10, the mortgage balance as of time of trial, thus showing 
that the capital gain could be as high as $183,000.00. (Exh. D-24) 
Therefore, the record was sufficient to make clear that a 
substantial tax issue needed to be addressed. 
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of sale. The home has not yet been sold. Even if, arguendo, it 
were to be sold by October 15, 1991, Husband would not qualify for 
the exclusion. Husband owned the home as of October 15, 1992, five 
years before the date of the hypothetical sale. However, Husband 
was ordered out of the home in August, 1994. Therefore, he would 
only have lived in the home between October 15, 1992, and August, 
1994, a period of less than two years. With each day beyond 
October 15, 1997, that the home does not sell, Husband falls short 
another day of having met the two year residence requirement. 
Section 121(c) is the typical nightmare of tax law drafting. 
It appears to entitle a home owner not meeting the requirements of 
Section 121(a) to a pro-rated use of the $250,000.00 exclusion to 
the extent a portion of the two years living requirement has 
occurred. Such pro-rated availability, however, would be 
contingent upon the owner meeting the requirement of Section 
121(c) (2) (B) , namely that "such sale or exchange is by reason of a 
change in place of employment, health, or, to the extent provided 
in the regulations, unforeseen circumstances." The sale of the 
home herein will not occur as the result of change of place of 
employment or for health reasons. No one knows what "unforeseen 
circumstances" means, but it may, or may not, apply to Husband 
because the home is being sold as the result of a decree of divorce 
which in and of itself may not be considered unforeseen. The 
change in the tax law may have been unforeseen, but the sale of the 
home may be argued to have been foreseen. 
Thus Husband is at risk of not qualifying at all for the 
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$250,000.00 exclusion or any portion thereof. Whereas under prior 
law, Husband could have at least rolled over any gain into a 
subsequent home, Husband can no longer do so under the present law. 
Therefore, Husband now faces paying taxes on the entire capital 
gain for the year when the home sells. It is inequitable for Wife 
to receive most of the home equity, to have lived in the home for 
two years since the divorce was granted, and yet to bear no 
responsibility for capital gains taxes on the home. 
It appears that this problem might be remedied to the benefit 
of both parties.5 On remand, the trial court could find that Wife 
has always been an owner of the home and reform the deed to include 
her as a co-owner effective the original date of purchase. It 
could then award the home to Wife and order that it immediately be 
sold with equities to be divided as otherwise ordered by the trial 
court and, if applicable, as altered by this appeal process. Wife, 
would then have been an owner for over five years and would have 
lived in the home for over two years before the sale date. This 
strategy, if successful, would allow Wife to use a $250,000.00 
exclusion and no taxes would result to the parties. 
This Court must find that it was error for the trial court to 
not consider capital gains taxes. It must remand with instructions 
for the trial court to consider the new tax law and, unless 
5Husband's counsel on this appeal are not tax attorneys. 
While they believe this scenario might work, the trial court should 
receive evidence from a tax expert to verify potential usefulness 
of the strategy. The trial court should order that tax liabilities 
be shared by the parties if the strategy were to not work and 
should order the parties to share the expenses of the tax expert. 
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otherwise justified, reform the deed, order title to pass to Wife 
before the sale of the home with Wife ordered to claim the new 
$250,000.00 exemption and order that the parties' equities be 
distributed therefrom. To the extent that the strategy is not 
used, or does not work, the trial court must order Wife to pay one-
half of the capital gains taxes assessed and one-half of any 
accountant and/or attorney's fees incurred in wrestling with the 
IRS. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING HUSBAND 
TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME EQUITY LINE OF 
CREDIT WHERE $11,500.00 OF SUCH DEBT RESULTED FROM THE 
TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER 
This issue was reserved and argued by Husband in Defendant's 
Written Comments to Court's Minute Entry. (R. 1231-12 88) Husband 
therein argued, "The home equity line of credit was clearly used to 
pay marital debts, obligations and support, and not the Defendant's 
personal debt. Therefore, the parties should be held equally 
liable for the home equity line of debt." (R. 1237) Husband 
further argued, "Based upon the fact that throughout this 
proceeding the Court has taxed the Defendant with imputed income at 
a level which he has never earned, the Court should use its 
equitable powers to afford the Defendant relief in the form of a 
credit for the overpayments which he has made to the Plaintiff." 
(R. 1240) 
As shown at pages 26 to 28 of Brief of Appellant, the trial 
court was confused in recalling loan balance amounts. Whether by 
accident or deliberate, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial 
8 
court to order Husband to pay the entire HELC balance where Husband 
had been ordered to pay excessive temporary support. In Endrody, 
the trial court properly declined to assess the husband the value 
of cattle sold for $20,000.00 to pay for temporary support where 
husband could not be employed at a level to supply such support. 
Similarly, herein it is uncontroverted that Husband was ordered to 
pay temporary support and expenses of $852.00 per month more than 
he was by final order based upon his income. Therefore, Wife must 
be ordered to pay one-half of the HELC balance above $14,000.00. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
IMPUTE FULL-TIME WORK INCOME TO WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF 
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
Wife advances the specious argument that Husband needs to 
prove that Wife can work full-time. It is Wife's burden to prove 
that she cannot work full-time since it is her duty to support her 
children under Sections 78-45-4(1) and 78-45-7.5(6) and (7), Utah 
Code Annotated. Beyond this, the evidence clearly showed that Wife 
was capable of holding full-time employment, since she had such 
employment with Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson but left it to 
spend after-school time with the children. (R. 1967-1975) 
However, the issue herein is the trial court's failure to 
consider Wife's ability to work without leaving early on days when 
the children are with their father. The trial court rested its 
decision upon its erroneous recollection of Dr. Stewart's 
recommendation (that both parents adjust their schedules) as being 
that Wife should work part-time. As shown at page 34 of Brief of 
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Appellant, Wife has 10 weekdays per month when she is free to work 
full days due to Husband having the children after school. She 
also has weekends and Husband's summer visitation to put in 
additional hours. 
Wife's argument notwithstanding, she clearly testified that 
her job was very flexible. Therefore, the trial court erred in not 
imputing full-time income to Wife, or alternatively, in not 
reducing Husband's income to part-time based upon his need to be at 
home with the children on the ten days each month that he has the 
children after school. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CHILD 
SUPPORT BY IMPUTING 100 PERCENT OF INCOME AT THE MAXIMUM 
TABLE AMOUNT TO HUSBAND AND ZERO TO WIFE WHERE HUSBAND'S 
INCOME DID NOT MEET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND WIFE HAD 
SUBSTANTIAL INCOME 
Wife does not directly reply to this point but presents her 
own appeal on the issue in Point IX of her cross-appeal. Husband 
rests upon his prior argument and on his reply to Point IX of 
Wife's cross-appeal. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING THE 
TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS TO HUSBAND 
Under Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P. 2d 877, 881 (Utah App. 
1995), the trial court had the duty to enter specific findings 
explaining its failure to award the exemptions to Husband. It did 
not do so and did not explain why it should not do so where it 
ordered Husband to pay maximum support under the table, granted 
Husband extensive visitation of the children with related living 
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expenses, did not require Wife to work full-time, granted Wife far 
more than one-half of the marital property and granted Wife 
attorney's fees where they were unwarranted. Under these 
conditions, the matter must be remanded for such consideration. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING WIFE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE WIFE WAS WITHOUT NEED, HUSBAND WAS 
WITHOUT ABILITY TO PAY AND ADEQUATE FINDINGS WERE NOT 
ENTERED 
Wife's argument inaccurately, but repeatedly stresses that 
Husband incurred and had the ability to pay $24,000.00 in 
attorneys' fees. However, such misrepresents the fact that while 
Husband incurred fees, he was not able to pay them. Attorney's 
liens over $43,000.00 were entered against Husband's share of the 
home equity because Husband's fees had not been paid. (R. 1730) 
This, plus Husband's inadequate share of the property award, leaves 
Husband with little ability to pay Wife's fees. Further, Wife's 
much greater than half award of the property left her with the 
ability to pay her own fees. 
As argued in Brief of Appellant, the trial court received no 
evidence to support Wife's contention that the $15,000.00 fees 
awarded Wife arose from Husband's applications for relief from the 
excessive temporary support order. There is no evidentiary basis 
to support such a finding of bad faith, or to show the actual 
amount of fees which arose from Husband's applications for relief. 
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CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT VII (Cross -appea l ) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INCLUDE INCOME 
FROM HUSBAND'S SECOND JOB IN COMPUTING HIS TOTAL MONTHLY 
INCOME FOR ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT PURPOSES 
Objection 
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered 
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her cross-
appeal. A cross-appellant, no less than an appellant, must 
"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's pertinent 
findings". Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 
1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective 
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to 
decline to address an issue appealed. (id.) Wife herein 
misrepresents or selectively cites to the record. Without waiving 
such objection, Husband addresses Wife's claim as follows: 
The trial court did not merely rely upon Husband's 1994 W-2. 
The trial court reviewed Husband's 1993 and 1994 income tax returns 
and his 1993 and 1994 W-2 tax statements before it "determined that 
Defendant's 1994 income as set forth on his W-2 form from the Spine 
Center is the best indicator of the Defendant's income prior to the 
filing of this matter." (Finding of Fact 6, R. 1638) The trial 
court also heard extensive testimony regarding Husband's employment 
and income.6 (R. 153-166, 189-224, 267, 365-403, Exh. D-12) 
6This was not a case involving self-employment where gross 
income was unclear. All of Husband's income is reflected by W-2's 
or 1099's. 
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Also contrary to Wife's representation, the record does not 
show that Husband "works only twenty-six hours per week at the 
Spine Center to earn his income." (Brief of Appellee/Cross 
Appellant, page 34) Husband testified that he was working "40-plus 
hours per week". (R. 2294) His reference to 26 hours was to 
"clinical hours" which are only a part of his full-time employment 
as a physician: 
A Yes. You interrupted me and I was explaining 
that my schedule hasn't been represented, so that puts me 
at about 2 6 clinical hours in the office, and then I have 
about half hour of dictation for each clinical hour, 
which puts me at 3 9 hours. And then I have studying and 
reading and research, and continuing medical education in 
addition to that. And that is more than I worked the 
previous year. 
(R. 2295)7 
While it is undisputed that Husband took a second job 
reviewing files for the Utah Worker's Compensation fund in 19958, 
such additional work was undertaken after the parties had separated 
in August, 1994, and was necessitated by the trial court's over-
assessment of temporary support to be paid by Husband. The trial 
court accepted evidence of the second job acknowledging that it 
needed to determine whether the job was "moonlighting or not." 
(R.2300-1) The trial court properly determined that the job was 
moonlighting and declined to include it in determining Husband's 
7Wife's failure to cite the foregoing portions of the record 
clearly constitute failure to marshal the evidence. 
8Husband testified that between April, 1995 and September, 
1995, he was paid $1,635.00 by the Workman's Compensation Fund. He 
had worked for them four hours during the month immediately prior 
to trial at $12 5 per hour, thus making about $1,000.00 during that 
month only. (R. 2301) 
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historical earnings. 
Wife's reliance upon Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P. 2d 877, 880 
(Utah App. 1995) , is misplaced. In Breinholt, the evidence showed 
that the parties had, during the marriage, relied upon husband's 
second check received from serving with the county commission to 
pay household expenses. This Court therein stated, 
This court has previously held that when 
determining an alimony award, "it is appropriate and 
necessary for a trial court to consider all sources of 
income that were used by the parties during their 
marriage to meet their self-defined needs, from whatever 
source--overtime, second job, self-employment, etc., as 
well as unearned income. 
(underlined emphasis added.) In this case, at no time before the 
parties separated in August, 1994, had the parties relied upon 
Husband working more than one job. Wife has cited nothing from the 
record to show that Husband had ever held multiple jobs "during 
[the parties'] marriage to meet their self-defined needs."9 
Wife's argument acknowledges that Husband took his second job 
in 1995 after the parties had separated and this action was 
pending. (Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant, page 34-5) . 
Therefore, the trial court was well within its discretion in 
finding that such additional job was moonlighting necessitated by 
additional living expenses associated with supporting two 
9Two winters prior to the separation of the parties, Husband 
had acted as a ski instructor in order to obtain ski discounts. (R. 
2258) Husband earned about $800 in 1993 as a ski instructor. (R. 
2494) Wife testified that Husband had not been a ski instructor 
during the winter (1993-4) preceding the parties' separation in 
August, 1994. (R. 2258) The trial court was clearly within its 
discretion to disregard Husband's one-time ski instructing as 
recreational and insignificant in terms of income. 
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households following the parties' separation and with Husband's 
high temporary support obligation. A contrary rule would 
improperly discourage spouses from taking additional employment 
pending divorce proceedings to meet related financial crises. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED WIFE WITH HER PORTION 
OF THE TAX BURDEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE IRA FUNDS 
Objection 
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered 
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her cross-
appeal. A cross-appellant, no less than an appellant, must 
"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's pertinent 
findings". Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 
1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective 
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to 
decline to address an issue appealed, (id.) Wife herein simply 
cites the finding of fact she disputes. Her argument has no other 
citations to the record. Without waiving such objection, Husband 
addresses Wife's claim as follows: 
As previously shown in Point I, Wife received a vastly greater 
share of the marital property than did Husband. Further, Husband 
used $22,960.00 of the IRA funds to pay taxes, which benefitted 
both parties and the value of such funds were no longer available 
to Husband at the time of trial although they were credited to 
Husband's property settlement. 
Husband's share of the home equity was charged $29,597.00 as 
Wife's net share of the $75,000.00 removed from the IRA by Husband. 
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Wife had previously received $6,450.00 in benefits from the 
$12,900.00 withdrawal authorized by the Court. Since Wife 
effectively received $36,047.00 of the IRA, and since Husband did 
not have equal property existing to be awarded to him, requiring 
Wife to pay one-half of the taxes associated with the IRA, and all 
but $645.00 of the penalty, was most reasonable and an appropriate 
use of the Court's discretion. 
Additionally, the trial court appropriately found "that the 
parties will save money if they are required to file jointly for 
tax year 1994." Indeed, such joint filing reduced the combined tax 
burden that would have had to be allocated between the parties if 
they had filed separately. 
When it is recognized that $22,960.00 of the IRA funds were 
paid by Husband for 1994 taxes in August, 1994, for both parties' 
benefit and were not available to be divided at time of trial10, 
Wife must pay one-half of the taxes on such funds in order that the 
parties equally share the tax obligation. Taxes owed on the 
$22,960.00 used to pay the parties' taxes must be equally shared 
between the parties. 
Husband was required to pay $6,855.00 of the penalty 
associated with early withdrawal of the $75,000.00, while Wife was 
required to pay only $645.00 associated with her one-half of the 
$12,900.00 authorized to be withdrawn by the Court. The parties 
resided together most of 1994. Therefore, Wife was not prejudiced 
by the allocation of 1994 tax responsibility. 
10As argued in Point I. 
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POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXTRAPOLATED BEYOND THE 
CHILD SUPPORT TABLE TO CALCULATE CHILD SUPPORT. 
OBJECTION 
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered 
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her cross-
appeal. A cross-appellant, no less than an appellant, must 
"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's pertinent 
findings". Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 
1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective 
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to 
decline to address an issue appealed. (id.) Wife fails to even 
cite the finding she disputes, let alone the factual record. 
Without waiving such objection, Husband addresses Wife's claim as 
follows: 
Wife's argument on this point is void of factual or legal 
references in the record to support her argument. Also, her claim 
at page 39 of her brief that sports activities are not anticipated 
by support figures set forth in the Table for determining support 
levels is not supported by citation to any legal authority. Wife 
fails to acknowledge that Husband's visitation time with the 
children is much greater than that provided in the standard 
visitation schedule11 and that Husband's expenses associated with 
food and other necessities for the children is higher than that 
anticipated by the Table in any event. 
lxSee Brief of Appellant, Point IV, page 34, Point V, pages 36. 
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Husband has fully addressed this issue in Point V of Brief of 
Appellant, pages 35-40. Rather than repeat himself, Husband 
respectfully refers the Court thereto. The Court erred in 
assessing 100 percent of the parties' income to Husband and should 
have assessed support at $1,12 0.00 rather than $1,400.00. Wife 
certainly is not entitled to a windfall of child support greater 
than $1,400.00 where Husband has possession of the children so much 
of the time. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
WIFE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY-DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE THAT HUSBAND DISSIPATED MARITAL ASSETS 
Objection 
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered 
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her cross-
appeal . A cross-appellant, no less than an appellant, must 
"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's pertinent 
findings11. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P. 2d 1252, 
1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective 
failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to 
decline to address an issue appealed. (id.) Wife herein simply 
cites the ruling she disputes. Her argument has no other citations 
to the record. 
Further, Wife's statements that she "learned for the first 
time during trial that Dr. Bova had set up a trust for his 
daughter" is a complete misrepresentation to this Court. At trial 
Wife introduced Exhibit P-9 (R. 2173-2174, 2203), a portfolio 
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listing which included the Strong Discovery Fund balance as of 
October 7, 1995. Wife was obviously aware of the fund before she 
went to trial since it was she who brought Exhibit P-9 to court. 
Without waiving his failure to marshal objection, Husband addresses 
Wife's claim as follows: 
As shown, Wife prior to trial was aware of the existence of 
the "trust fund" established on behalf of Husband's daughter, 
Melissa. She introduced Exhibit P-9 (R. 2173, 2203) and requested 
that her share of the marital estate be enhanced by monies paid by 
Husband into irrevocable gift accounts for the parties' two 
children, Mikell and Christopher, and for Melissa, Husband's 
daughter by a prior marriage, (id.) The trial court never made 
such adjustment in its rulings.12 Such was proper as the children, 
not Husband, benefitted from such accounts and there was no 
evidence provided that Husband had unreasonably established or 
funded such accounts. 
Wife, being aware of the accounts set forth in Exhibit P-9, 
was obligated through discovery procedures to obtain additional 
information of the account status prior to trial, if she intended 
to make the amounts of the accounts an issue at trial. This she 
failed to do. In the case In re State of Utah, in the Interest of 
J.P., K.D., and K.D. , Persons under Eighteen Years of Age, 921 P.2d 
1012, 1017, (Utah App. 1996) this Court stated, 
12Wife's argument creates the erroneous impression that Wife 
had asked only that she be credited one-half of the value of funds 
paid to Melissa's account, whereas Wife testified that she desired 
to be credited one-half of the funds deposited into all three 
children's accounts. (R. 2173) 
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Under established Rule 59 case law, the moving party 
must prove the evidence offered meets three requirements 
for a new trial to be granted. > Id. at 57-58. "First, 
it must be material, competent evidence which is in fact 
newly discovered. Second, it must be such that it could 
not, by due diligence, have been discovered and produced 
at trial." > Id. at 58. "Finally, it must not be merely 
cumulative or incidental, but must be of sufficient 
substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with 
it there would have been a different result." > Id. 
Additionally, " [n] ewly discovered evidence must relate to 
facts which were 'in existence at the time of trial.' " 
> In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 
549 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted); see > In re S.R., 
735 P.2d at 58. 
The trial court properly denied Wife's motion on the second 
requirement above set forth, to-wit: "that the Court believes the 
information upon which the Motion is based was available to 
Plaintiff through discovery prior to trial." (R. 1855) Wife 
should have obtained the account records during discovery, if she 
intended to make them an issue.13 
POINT XI 
WIPE SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED ON 
APPEAL 
Objection 
Husband, initially objects to this issue being considered 
because Wife fails to marshal the evidence regarding her cross-
appeal. A cross-appellant, no less than an appellant, must 
"marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's pertinent 
findings". Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 
1260 (Utah App. 1996) A complete failure to marshal or a selective 
13The trial court would have been further correct in denying 
the motion on the first and third requirements as the "new" 
evidence was not really newly new and would have been cumulative or 
incidental in any effect. 
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failure to marshal such evidence is grounds for this Court to 
decline to address an issue appealed, (id.) Wife herein simply 
asks for attorney's fees on appeal without providing any factual 
record regarding her need, Husband's ability to pay, and 
reasonableness. 
In Point V of Brief of Appellant, Husband fully addresses the 
legal requirements for an award of attorney's fees and shows 1) 
that Wife had no need for an award of attorney's fees at trial 
given her generous property award, 2) that given the gross inequity 
of the property division and his own fees, Husband was without 
ability to pay Wife's fees, and 3) that Wife had provided no 
evidentiary basis regarding the reasonableness of the award of 
attorney's fees awarded at trial. 
Husband's appeal is clearly based upon good faith issues which 
require review by this Court. Wife should not be awarded 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither party has challenged the decree granting each party a 
divorce. However, the other rulings of the trial court addressed 
herein must be reversed and the case remanded as requested by 
Husband. The trial court must be instructed to properly credit 
Husband's property settlement $21,756.50; to order that the home be 
deeded to, and immediately sold by Wife with the parties' equities 
protected, or, with Wife to be responsible for one-half of the 
capital gains taxes from the sale of the home and any professional 
fees paid to tax experts; to order Wife to be responsible for one-
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half of the home equity loan balance between $14,000.00 and 
$25,435.00 [($25,435.00-$14,000.00)/2=$5,717.50]; to impute full-
time income to Wife for purposes of child support and alimony; to 
allocate child support pro rata on the parties' incomes at a 
maximum income of $10,000.00 as set forth in Husband's prior brief; 
to award Husband the tax dependency exemptions; and to order Wife 
to pay her own attorney's fees. 
Wife's appeal must be rejected on all points, but if upheld on 
any point, such change must indicate how other rulings may be 
adjusted thereby. For example, if Wife were to be awarded more 
child support, she would need less alimony and there would be even 
less need for her to recover her attorney's fees or for her to 
receive the exemptions/deductions for the children. 
DATED this / r day of October, 1997. 
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H.R.2014 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President)) 
SEC. 312. EXEMPTION FROM TAX FOR GAIN ON SALE OF PRINCIPAL 
RESIDENCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 121 (relating to one-time exclusion of gain from sale of principal 
residence by individual who has attained age 55) is amended to read as follows: 
SEC. 121. EXCLUSION OF GAIN FROM SALE OF PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE. 
'(a) EXCLUSION- Gross income shall not include gain from the sale or exchange of property if, 
during the 5-year period ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has been owned 
and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal residence for periods aggregating 2 years or 
more. 
\b) LIMITATIONS-
XI) IN GENERAL- The amount of gain excluded from gross income under subsection (a) 
with respect to any sale or exchange shall not exceed $250,000. 
X2) $500,000 LIMITATION FOR CERTAIN JOINT RETURNS- Paragraph (1) shall be 
applied by substituting '$500,000' for '$250,000' if-
XA) a husband and wife make a joint return for the taxable year of the sale or 
exchange of the property, 
XB) either spouse meets the ownership requirements of subsection (a) with respect to 
such property, 
XQ both spouses meet the use requirements of subsection (a) with respect to such 
property, and 
XD) neither spouse is ineligible for the benefits of subsection (a) with respect to such 
property by reason of paragraph (3). 
X3) APPLICATION TO ONLY 1 SALE OR EXCHANGE EVERY 2 YEARS-
XA) IN GENERAL- Subsection (a) shall not apply to any sale or exchange by the 
taxpayer if, during the 2-year period ending on the date of such sale or exchange, 
there was any other sale or exchange by the taxpayer to which subsection (a) applied. 
http://thomas.loc.gOv/c.temp/-cl05kU3G:el60987: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cl05:l:./temp/~cl05kU3G:el60987: 
XB) PRE-MAY 7, 1997, SALES NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT- Subparagraph 
(A) shall be applied without regard to any sale or exchange before May 7, 1997. 
Xc) EXCLUSION FOR TAXPAYERS FAILING TO MEET CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS-
XI) IN GENERAL- In the case of a sale or exchange to which this subsection applies, the 
ownership and use requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply and subsection (b)(3) shall 
not apply; but the amount of gain excluded from gross income under subsection (a) with 
respect to such sale or exchange shall not exceed— 
XA) the amount which bears the same ratio to the amount which would be so 
excluded under this section if such requirements had been met, as 
'(B) the shorter of— 
Xi) the aggregate periods, during the 5-year period ending on the date of such 
sale or exchange, such property has been owned and used by the taxpayer as the 
taxpayer's principal residence, or 
Xii) the period after the date of the most recent prior sale or exchange by the 
taxpayer to which subsection (a) applied and before the date of such sale or 
exchange, 
bears to 2 years. 
X2) SALES AND EXCHANGES TO WHICH SUBSECTION APPLIES- This subsection 
shall apply to any sale or exchange if— 
XA) subsection (a) would not (but for this subsection) apply to such sale or exchange 
by reason of— 
Xi) a failure to meet the ownership and use requirements of subsection (a), or 
Xii) subsection (b)(3), and 
'(B) such sale or exchange is by reason of a change in place of employment, health, 
or, to the extent provided in regulations, unforeseen circumstances. 
Xd) SPECIAL RULES-
XI) JOINT RETURNS- If a husband and wife make a joint return for the taxable year of the 
sale or exchange of the property, subsections (a) and (c) shall apply if either spouse meets 
the ownership and use requirements of subsection (a) with respect to such property. 
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H.R.2014 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Enrolled BUI (Sent to President)) 
SEC. 311. MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATES FOR INDIVIDUALS. 
(a) IN GENERAL- Subsection (h) of section 1 (relating to maximum capital gains rate) is 
amended to read as follows: 
'(h) MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATE-
XI) IN GENERAL- If a taxpayer has a net capital gain for any taxable year, the tax imposed 
by this section for such taxable year shall not exceed the sum of— 
'(A) a tax computed at the rates and in the same manner as if this subsection had not 
been enacted on the greater of— 
\ i ) taxable income reduced by the net capital gain, or 
'(ii) the lesser of— 
'(I) the amount of taxable income taxed at a rate below 28 percent, or 
XII) taxable income reduced by the adjusted net capital gain, plus 
XB) 25 percent of the excess (if any) of— 
Xi) the unrecaptured section 1250 gain (or, if less, the net capital gain), over 
Xii) the excess (if any) of— 
XI) the sum of the amount on which tax is determined under 
subparagraph (A) plus the net capital gain, over 
XII) taxable income, plus 
XQ 28 percent of the amount of taxable income in excess of the sum of— 
Xi) the adjusted net capital gain, plus 
Xii) the sum of the amounts on which tax is determined under subparagraphs 
(A) and (B), plus 
XD) 10 percent of so much of the taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain (or, if less, 
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taxable income) as does not exceed the excess (if any) of~ 
\i) the amount of taxable income which would (without regard to this 
paragraph) be taxed at a rate below 28 percent, over 
\ii) the taxable income reduced by the adjusted net capital gain, plus 
"(E) 20 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain (or, if less, taxable income) 
in excess of the amount on which a tax is determined under subparagraph (D). 
\2) REDUCED CAPITAL GAIN RATES FOR QUALIFIED 5-YEAR GAIN-
\A) REDUCTION IN 10-PERCENT RATE- In the case of any taxable year 
beginning after December 31, 2000, the rate under paragraph (1)(D) shall be 8 percent 
with respect to so much of the amount to which the 10-percent rate would otherwise 
apply as does not exceed qualified 5-year gain, and 10 percent with respect to the 
remainder of such amount. 
"(B) REDUCTION IN 20-PERCENT RATE- The rate under paragraph (1)(E) shall be 
18 percent with respect to so much of the amount to which the 20-percent rate would 
otherwise apply as does not exceed the lesser of— 
\i) the excess of qualified 5-year gain over the amount of such gain taken into 
account under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, or 
\ii) the amount of qualified 5-year gain (determined by taking into account 
only property the holding period for which begins after December 31, 2000), 
and 20 percent with respect to the remainder of such amount. For purposes of 
determining under the preceding sentence whether the holding period of property 
begins after December 31, 2000, the holding period of property acquired pursuant to 
the exercise of an option (or other right or obligation to acquire property) shall 
include the period such option (or other right or obligation) was held. 
\3) NET CAPITAL GAIN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS INVESTMENT INCOME- For 
purposes of this subsection, the net capital gain for any taxable year shall be reduced (but 
not below zero) by the amount which the taxpayer takes into account as investment income 
under section 163(d)(4)(B)(iii). 
THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT GO TO 
Next Hit Forward New Search 
Prev Hit Back HomePage 
Hit List Best Sections Help 
Doc Contents 
